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Dueling Stakeholders and Dual-Hatted Systems Engineers:  
Engineering Challenges, Capabilities and Skills in  
Government Infrastructure Technology Projects 
ABSTRACT 
Engineering projects that support government enterprises face substantial challenges due to 
demands from diverse stakeholders and rapidly-changing technologies. In this paper, we present 
findings from analysis of five case studies of systems engineering projects for large government 
enterprises. We focus on what can be learned from systems engineers, their essential role, and 
their engineering practices. As they work to establish interoperability across pre-existing and 
new technologies—thereby evolving infrastructure—the engineers commonly face “agonistic” 
tensions between groups of stakeholders. Temporal pacing conflicts are especially prevalent, 
such as those between stakeholder groups concerned with fast-paced streams of innovation and 
stakeholder groups concerned with current operations. In response, many engineers are following 
an evolutionary approach, developing new capabilities for managing projects and individual 
professional skill sets. The engineers’ adaptive response can be understood as incremental 
modularization and re/integration of technologies and associated practices across organizational 
(stakeholder) boundaries. Additionally, engineers are developing new skills of influence to 
support these capabilities for addressing stakeholder tensions. We close by discussing 
implications of our findings for the management of infrastructure technology projects, emergent 
design and engineering of organizational infrastructure, and the changing role of systems 
engineers. 
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Introduction 
Government leaders are increasing their reliance on new information technology as an 
occasion for coordinating and consolidating the efforts of multiple agencies into enterprises that 
share information and provide government services.  By “enterprise” we refer to sets of 
organizations brought together to produce a product or service on a large scale.  Rather than 
developing a single stove-piped system for a hierarchically-organized customer, as in traditional 
systems-building engineering, enterprise systems engineering projects confront multiple 
information and communication systems and technologies—many already in operational use— 
that must be somehow linked into a coherent infrastructure for diverse and competing 
stakeholder communities.  For example, the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.) are 
now being pressured to collaborate as a single “Joint” force, at the same time they are 
undergoing the Department of Defense’s version of business process reengineering (called 
“Transformation of Force Structure”) and an ongoing transition toward “net-centric operations.”  
These new developments in government enterprises can be understood as evolving from a 
technical focus on systems building to a multi-faceted sociotechnical process linking 
organizational practices, technical systems and social norms, both locally and globally (Edwards, 
Jackson, Bowker and Knobel 2007). 
This paper reports on the results of a research study on social and organizational aspects 
of systems engineering for government enterprises.  In the paper, we first discuss the nature of 
systems engineering work and summarize relevant work on infrastructure by Edwards and 
associates.  We then describe our research approach and present results from our analysis of five 
case studies of large government enterprise system projects, revealing how systems engineers are 
adapting their engineering practices and themselves to meet the challenges inherent in the shift 
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from systems to infrastructure. We find that systems engineers working at the enterprise scale are 
changing both their capabilities for managing projects and their individual professional skill sets.  
Next we discuss implications of these findings for the management of infrastructure technology 
projects, for emergent design and engineering of government enterprises, and for the changing 
role of systems engineers.  We conclude with identification of some limitations of our work and 
some suggestions for future research.  
Systems Engineering 
Systems Engineering began as a sub-discipline of engineering during the late 1940s and 
1950s when the development of weapons systems and aerospace systems was expanding beyond 
the scope and tools of separate engineering disciplines (Johnson 2003; Sapolsky 2003).  By 
offering the label of “system,” the focus was placed on the technical system being engineered, 
such as a missile or airplane, rather than on the component pieces that were the responsibility of 
discipline-based sub-teams and subcontractors.  The major activities within systems engineering 
are systems analysis, acquisition and supply, project management, system design (requirements 
and specifications) and integration, implementation or transition to use, and technical evaluation 
(Martin 2000; Johnson 2003:36).   
Traditional systems engineering methods for achieving interoperability and avoiding 
redundancies are predicated on long development cycles and emphasize formally structured 
requirements, specifications, and integration testing at the end of the project.  However, in large 
enterprises with different systems and technologies evolving at different rates, component 
technologies must now be (continuously) integrated across different stages, and traditional 
approaches such as the waterfall method are no longer practical.  The field of systems 
engineering has thus continued to evolve as more large-scale systems are developed in military 
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and civilian applications.  The term “system-of-systems” is routinely applied to distinguish more 
complicated systems engineering from typical systems engineering (Keating, Rogers, Unal & 
Dryer 2003; Farr 2008).   
Yet experienced systems engineers have a growing sense that traditional systems 
engineering approaches and even systems-of-systems engineering are no longer adequate for 
meeting the challenges associated with engineering for large government enterprises.  As one 
senior systems engineer commented on a recent engineering program:  “[The complexity of the 
enterprise organization] broke a significant number of the traditional systems engineering 
practices that we depend on… [The state of the] practice didn’t apply, or we couldn’t impose 
it… one way or another it was undermined by the enterprise environment.”  
With little availability of formal training on systems thinking and other necessary skills 
(Davidz 2006), systems engineers are adapting by developing ad hoc approaches through work 
experience.  Our study examines these engineering challenges and the engineers’ adaptive 
response in detail, with the intent of capturing emerging enterprise systems engineering 
knowledge that can be useful for understanding and improving the management of such 
engineering projects.  
Infrastructure Evolution 
One theoretical perspective that sheds light on the difficulties faced by systems engineers 
has been developed by historian of science and technology Paul Edwards and his associates.  
They draw distinctions between technical systems and infrastructures, positing that 
infrastructures are comprised of networks and internetworks (Edwards 1998; Edwards et al. 
2007).  In their taxonomy, technical systems support a small number of basic functions, and are 
comprised of heterogeneous components and subsystems.  Systems are usually built under 
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centralized control as “stove-pipe” systems and can be changed only slowly.  Networks meet a 
larger number of functions, and are pieced together from multiple heterogeneous systems using 
gateways, which are “technologies and standards” that “allow dissimilar systems to be linked” 
(Edwards et al. 2007: i, 8, 10).   Networks are more often under distributed control; they also are 
reconfigurable and have shifting boundaries.  Internetworks (also called webs) have a “near 
infinite number of functions” (Edwards 1998:21), are comprised of heterogeneous networks and 
rely on other infrastructures.  Control of internetworks is weak; they are subject to widely 
distributed coordination.  They are open, configurable, and continually being extended.  
Infrastructures are combinations of technical elements and social practices that “enable locally 
controlled and maintained systems to interoperate more or less seamlessly…. ubiquitous, 
reliable, and widely shared resources operating on national and transnational, scales” (Edwards 
et al. 2007: 12).    
Edwards et al. (2007: 7-11) identify several stages in the progression from systems to 
infrastructure.  Two of these stages are of particular importance to us here.  One is the system 
building stage, in which the designers of systems are considered “visionaries” and have a lot of 
control over what the final system will look like.  This is the kind of engineering that the 
profession of systems engineering was developed to provide.  The other is a consolidation phase, 
during which separate systems and/or networks are linked together – first in smaller area 
networks and then more globally.   This is accomplished either by one system taking over, or 
more commonly through the use of gateways.  
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Agonistic Tensions 
Perhaps most important for systems engineers facing the transition of their work from 
systems-building to infrastructure consolidation are what Edwards et al. (2007) refer to as 
“agonistic” tensions.  
Infrastructures of all types have encountered, and often provoked, a series of deeply felt 
tensions. Once established, infrastructures may hide or disguise such tensions, so that 
once bitterly-contested decisions and design choices appear as unproblematic or even 
natural features…. [But] infrastructures, especially those in the making, are what political 
scientists term agonistic phenomena: imagined, produced, refined, and occasionally 
reassessed in a stratified and deeply conflictual field. (Edwards et al. 2007: 24)   
Edwards et al. identify several classes of agonistic tensions.  The first is interest and 
exclusion, based on the observation that there are “winners” and “losers” in each infrastructure 
development effort.  The uneven distribution of opportunities shapes and can redefine the roles 
that different stakeholders take on, along with their power to influence the evolution of the 
infrastructure.  Their second category of tension, ownership / investment, refers to tensions 
anchored in funding mechanisms, policy options, and other external influences that play 
important roles in evolving infrastructure.  After describing our research approach and cases, we 
will explain how an agonistic tension perspective informs our understanding of the major 
challenges faced by systems engineers on infrastructure technology projects.  
Research Approach 
Overview 
Our research approach is grounded in case studies of five projects contracted between 
government enterprises and the MITRE Corporation, an organization that administers Federally-
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) involved in the technical design of large 
technical systems for government enterprises.  We utilized cross-case comparative analysis 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Markus & Lee 1999; Friedman & Sage 2004; Yin 1994) to develop the results 
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presented here.  Our team was comprised of two researchers from MIT and several social 
scientists and senior engineer practitioners from MITRE (the exact number fluctuated over the 
three years of the project, Fall 2005 – Summer 2008).  This combination of talents afforded a 
range of interpretive perspectives to make sense of the data we collected.  Each of the five case 
studies was written by one or two of the team members.  
Due to the nature of the research material, concerns about the possibility of disclosure of 
sensitive information related to government programs surfaced from several perspectives. The 
research process was reviewed and approved by both the MITRE Institutional Review Board 
(MIRB) and the MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES).  
Unusually strong vigilance was required to protect the well-being of all parties involved, 
including interview participants and program managers, as well as the reputations of MITRE and 
its sponsors.  Hence, we are not able to provide individual case summaries, but instead discuss 
aggregate data and analysis, so that results and quotations are never attributed to a specific case.   
The Cases 
All five cases were enterprise-scale projects with tens of thousands of users, some with 
hundreds of thousands.   Each represented a MITRE work program for government agencies, 
involving integration of new IT capabilities with legacy systems.  As mentioned above, this 
paper uses aggregated data to safeguard national security, in addition to protecting the identities 
of the engineers, the programs, and the government agencies.  Nevertheless, we can report that 
major technologies included a pair of operations planning tools; an integrated, scalable 
communications platform; a globally-dispersed operations intelligence information system; a 
multi-national command and control system; and a large-scale program coordination and 
development effort.   Projects ranged from a two-year effort focused on transforming a large 
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globally-distributed legacy environment into a centralized service-based IT model, to a multi-
year effort involving multiple cabinet-level agencies and industry sectors, and focused on 
guiding the evolution of a nationally-distributed operational environment.  Three of the five 
cases studied were “Joint” (i.e. coordinated across all military services).  Although several 
projects were less than ten years old, some of the legacy environments involved had been in use 
for several decades.  Modernizing these legacy environments often required the consolidation of 
dozens of independent (and incompatible) databases, numerous external interfaces, a wide 
variety of both commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and custom-designed applications, and multiple 
systems at different stages of their life-cycles.  Efforts were also dependent upon the willingness 
of stakeholders to move toward integrated, networked, available-on-demand environments.   
All of the projects presented challenges to traditional systems engineering approaches—
challenges which were more than strictly technical in nature.  For example, one case involved an 
attempt to merge a legacy mainframe environment maintained through traditional systems 
engineering approaches, with a newer web-based system being developed with agile, rapid 
prototyping approaches.  Another project addressed the challenge of consolidating formerly 
independent systems development environments across multiple agencies in order to achieve 
cost savings and ease data sharing, without stifling the creativity and innovativeness found in 
those locally-focused environments.  A third effort was a long-term (i.e., more than a decade) 
project to build on existing technologies and capabilities by incorporating emerging technologies 
and the ability to integrate data streams from multiple sources across several agencies and 
sources, in order to manage an anticipated two-to-three-fold increase in system demand over the 
next two to three decades.  
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Data Collection 
Senior engineer-practitioner members of the research team designed a semi-structured 
interview protocol.   One pilot interview was conducted with another senior systems engineer 
and slight modifications were made to improve the protocol.  The final version is included as an 
appendix.  Senior managers overseeing each project provided researchers with the names of 
project leads who then identified qualified potential interviewees for each case study.  For three 
of the cases, potential interviewees were sent a letter by their manager explaining the study and 
requesting their participation; all of these people agreed to be interviewed.  For the other two 
cases, managers solicited volunteers more generally, and more people volunteered to be 
interviewed than in the cases where candidates were hand-picked.   
The engineer-researchers were first trained by the social scientists on appropriate 
methods for conducting objective and thorough interviews.  Interviews were then generally led 
by one engineer-researcher, while at least two case writers with social science backgrounds took 
notes and interjected clarifying questions when necessary. An advantage of this approach was 
that the engineers being interviewed felt more comfortable talking about their experience in 
conversation with another engineer.  Also, the engineer-researchers could then help interpret the 
interview notes that the social science researchers had recorded.  Interviews were planned to take 
about an hour to complete; however, most took longer and many participants willingly gave 
ninety minutes of their time.  Researchers also sought background information from various 
other media, including newspaper articles and archived project materials.  Between three and six 
interviews were carried out for each case during the 2006-2007 timeframe.  Some additional 
interviews were conducted in 2008, using revised methods.  Altogether, a total of thirty-three 
interviews were conducted across the five cases.  
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Data Analysis 
Analysis was performed in several phases.  First, the primary author(s) of each case read 
through all typed data notes from the interviews on that case, and performed ad hoc coding to 
identify key themes.  The team held weekly meetings to discuss the cases and emerging themes.  
The team also created a common case outline to ensure consistency across the studies, then 
authors adapted the outline somewhat for each case.   
Each case was written as a detailed history of the specific engineering program, including 
a timeline of critical events, organizational charts, program accomplishments, challenges faced, 
engineering practices, lessons learned, and suggestions for further research.  The narratives were 
developed weaving together the themes found in the data.  After an initial draft of each case was 
prepared, its author(s) shepherded the case study through an extensive series of 
review/revise/release cycles, first with other social science members of the team, then with an 
engineer-researcher, next with the project interviewees, and finally with the project managers in 
charge of the relevant work program before the case was released internally within the company.  
Roughly one year later, a second round of coding was performed by the principal 
investigator who reviewed all of the original interview notes, the five case studies and writings 
on the high level themes, and identified the cross-cutting subthemes developed in this paper.  
Analysis 
Challenges: Agonistic Tensions 
In this section, we first describe the evidence we found for two types of agonistic tensions 
identified by Edwards et al. (2007), especially in those programs undergoing a consolidation 
phase (where technological convergence is easier than integrating social and organizational 
aspects).  We then describe an additional type of agonistic tension not identified by Edwards and 
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associates: regarding the pacing of enterprise change and the evolutionary process of 
infrastructure development itself (tensions developed by Edwards et al. 2007 mainly pertained to 
the distributional structure of resources and outcomes of the infrastructure development process).  
We close this section with a discussion of how the agonistic tensions are experienced by the 
engineers themselves, leading into the next section on their adaptive responses to the challenges. 
The first set of tensions identified by Edwards et al. (2007), those concerning 
interest/exclusion, occurred so frequently during engineering requirements definition that they 
were sometimes referred to as “food fights” (suggesting that engineers would fling messy details 
of constraints at one another).  Tensions also commonly surfaced in struggles around 
practicalities of designing technology gateways for bridging across different systems and 
networks. These tensions seemed unavoidable:  although cooperation among stakeholders is 
essential to an enterprise, there are huge differences in language and philosophy between 
technologists, managers, policymakers, and members of the civil and military services 
(customers/users) (cf. Schein 1996).  As one senior engineer noted, “Different groups have very 
different motivations, everyone has their own objectives – occasionally they align.” And then the 
engineer added:  “No, they don’t align. They don’t align yet, let me put it that way.  If we’re 
successful, they’ll have to align.” 
We also found empirical support for Edwards et al’s (2007) category of 
ownership/investment agonistic tensions: “Applications have to be developed by industry in a 
netware environment; they can’t be developed in isolation….  [and at the same time,] strategic 
partnerships (e.g. Microsoft) are not under our control.”  These tensions with external 
stakeholders also commonly surfaced around funding and budgetary arrangements:  
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“Congressional districts are among the stakeholders—How do you deal with the congressional 
politics?” “The … industry controls a large portion of … jobs in congressional districts.”   
Engineers were well-aware that funding, policies and other external constraints were 
grounded in ownership/investment relations, and were significant sources of tension for their 
engineering projects.  Interviewees described these tensions quite explicitly:   
… many programs that build platforms quite often choose control over the 
[gateway technology] to go inside or contract to have [gateway technology] built because 
it gives them flexibility ….  When outsiders dictate which [gateway technology], you 
lose control and there’s higher risk. 
 
Originally, [military service experimentation lab] was controller of [prototyping 
technology].  They wanted to cut it and throw it to [acquisition agency].  And [acquisition 
agency] said no, [service research arm], this is yours.  So [service research arm] took 
control of it.  [Acquisition agency] will integrate it if possible.  [Service research arm] 
wants to do all development and take all away from [acquisition agency].  [Acquisition 
agency] thinks doing fielding only is dysfunctional and wants to do development too. 
  
Analysis also revealed that some of our cases exhibited significantly more conflicting 
customer groups and agonistic tensions than others.  The government enterprise technology 
consolidation projects that the engineers considered successful were the only two whose member 
organizations had joined the enterprise voluntarily (benefits of cooperation appeared obvious).  
Thus these established government enterprises had relations between major stakeholder already 
worked out, the overall enterprise structures were relatively stable and there were policies in 
place to enforce compliance, all before technological consolidation was undertaken.  On the 
other hand, the three projects using mandated technological consolidation as a means to establish 
a new government enterprise were comprised of organizational units that had traditionally 
competed with each other for funding and political recognition; these programs were considered 
by the engineers to be much more troubled (if not outright failures).  Additionally, we found that 
 14 
the one effort to design technological gateways without formally addressing the issues associated 
with agonistic tensions, was not effective.   
Tensions around Pacing   
In reviewing the engineers’ comments about the challenges they face, we were 
particularly struck by a prominent set of tensions not developed by Edwards et al. (2007), around 
differences in stakeholders’ orientations to enterprise change, especially the pace at which it 
should proceed.  As Ancona & Chong (1996) note in their work on entrainment, organizational 
entities may adjust or synchronize the pacing, cycles and rhythm of their activities to an external 
“pacer” – something in the environment with a rhythm that the organizational entity then 
assumes.  When different organizational entities are working well with each other, their rhythms 
and tempos are normally in sync.  In our cases however, clashes between organizations 
responsible for exploiting fast-paced streams of innovation and those concerned with slower-
paced testing and integration into operational processes seemed omnipresent.  As each 
organization struggled to entrain to multiple pacers, the resulting effect not infrequently seemed 
more like a war over which organization would submit to the other’s pace, rather than the “dance 
of entrainment” that Ancona & Waller (2007) describe.   
One might argue that these pacing tensions could be derived from the agonistic tensions 
initially presented by Edwards and associates (2007) – interest/exclusion and 
ownership/investment – because pacing tensions are closely aligned with funding and budgetary 
control issues.  Yet across all of our cases, control over the pacing of change was the most 
prominent issue articulated by the engineers and apparently one of the hardest to resolve; we also 
maintain that it is theoretically significant (see below).   
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The most common version of such conflicts occurred between (on the one hand) 
government organizations that wanted enterprise evolution entrained to their visions for new 
capabilities enabled by technological innovation and (on the other hand) organizations tightly 
coupled with ongoing mission operations.  The former were long-range planning or R&D 
organizations (often bearing names that included “lab” or “experimentation” in their title).  The 
latter were government organizations either directly engaged in current operations, or responsible 
for the “acquisition” of technologies to meet the needs of users already working in the field (and 
therefore dependent upon situated combinations of legacy and innovative technologies).   
In each case, senior officials concerned with “transformation” of military forces or “next 
generation” civil technologies had been advocating discontinuous change; whereas senior 
officials primarily concerned with ongoing operations and end-users out in the field displayed 
little tolerance for any change that was more than incremental.  One such case of technology 
design was described eloquently by a manager via email: 
There were (and still are) deeply divided views regarding [this technology] within 
the [service branch].  There are loosely two camps.  One camp … tend to emphasis leap-
ahead capability.  Their focus is on the [technology] to be fielded [ten years out].  The 
other camp … tend to emphasize more rapid fielding across the broader force 
(e.g., lower-cost, good enough capabilities).  . . . [the technology championed by the first 
camp] has been a sacred cow within the [service branch], senior [service branch] 
leadership has generally supported the [first] camp.  However, the cost, duration, and 
importance of [the war effort] has led many within the [service branch] to become vocal 
proponents for a relook at our … strategy (i.e., other camp).   
 
Pacing tensions were aggravated by two factors.  First, the institutional arrangements for 
“acquisition” (the contractual, legal, and regulatory arrangements for how new technological 
systems are to be funded, built, and fielded) are rigorous and proceed cautiously.  This has been 
necessary because operational contexts often place many lives at stake; the risks associated with 
new software-dependent technologies must be carefully managed (Leveson 1986).  Yet the 
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qualitative increases in capabilities enabled by new technological innovations are emerging with 
increasing rapidity (correlating with Moore’s Law), thereby creating inherent conflicts with 
acquisition and operational rhythms.  One engineer noted: “The acquisition system doesn’t 
support IT acquisition well, the testing process alone is too long.”  Another interviewee referred 
to inter-organizational tensions more directly:  
… there was conflict between the acquisition side, [which was] relying on historical 
understanding of what it takes to field a product in safe and suitable way, and a [rapid 
prototyping / agile] group who was trying to foster a leaner and new approach.  Distrust, 
mistrust, second guessing, not best of relationship. … ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them.’   
Thus we found deeply-engrained oppositions between those organizations responsible for 
supporting the steady tempo of operations, and those responsible for the more discontinuous 
pulses of R&D endeavors.   
Secondly, these differences are intensified by structural tensions impeding the ability of 
most large government bureaucracies to effectively manage change at all.  While the leadership 
of government agencies can sometimes be of long tenure, technology projects are more often 
initiated by individuals who occupy their positions for only a two-to-three year period before 
moving on to other jobs due to political appointments or military rotations.  This is enough time 
to plan for and start a transition or new program, but rarely enough time to complete it, leaving it 
for the next individual to bring things to a close.  Yet the next individual brings their own 
agenda, goals, and new programs.  Thus, there is rarely a single individual in charge of the entire 
enterprise for long enough to effectively mediate differences among the stakeholders or dictate 
final decisions.  As one engineer described a resulting situation:  “The program was already 
going, processes already in place.  Then the new PEO was trying to put his new [plan] in place.  
Trying new architecture, requirements, specs.  People were already building things. …Other 
things start clean.  So, we’re a little broken in my mind.”  
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Furthermore, these recurring patterns of leadership turnover are set against a majority of 
personnel in both the civil service and military commands who are long-term (if not lifetime) 
employees enjoying considerable job security.  These mid- and lower- level government 
employees, faced with pressure to change from the top, often find it most expedient to resist 
change by simply waiting for leader-initiated changes to “blow over” as leaders leave. Referred 
to as “slow rolling,” this commonly occurs when rank-and-file members see no benefit to 
cooperating with transitory change efforts.  This deeply entrenched pattern of resistance to 
change renders successful change efforts the exception rather than the rule.  One interviewee 
made the point explicitly:  “The culture is changing, but only because I think [the top two 
leaders] have stayed there long enough ….  if people don’t see the value, they will slow roll 
you.”  
Engineers’ Experience of Pacing Tensions 
Thus, systems engineers working to establish interoperability across pre-existing 
technological systems and networks continually face clashes in the temporal rhythms of the 
different organizations already using those systems and networks, in addition to the tempo of 
changes in the technologies themselves – regardless of a project’s relative success or failure.  
And as with any professional group, the career aspirations of engineers are closely linked to 
perceptions of meeting professional responsibilities and establishing competent reputations  (Van 
Maanen & Barley 1984).  When the problems cannot be resolved technologically or at the 
organizational level, the engineers find themselves motivated to initiate changes at individual 
and project levels.  In this section, we describe some aspects of the engineers’ working context 
from their own perspective, in order to emphasize their motivation to develop adaptive 
capabilities and practices.   
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In engineering requirements, pacing tensions are so familiar that they have been given 
names such as “requirements creep” and “requirements churn.”  In some enterprise-scale 
projects, these become ubiquitous.  One engineer described this trend in his project succinctly:  
“the only thing that is constant in our world is changing requirements.”  Another revealed a more 
humorous attitude – when asked “How does your program deal with changing requirements and 
constraints?” he responded with a sly grin: “Daily.”  
The traditional waterfall method for systems engineering – completing one stage before 
beginning the next – simply does not work for developing government infrastructure because the 
technologies that engineers need to integrate are at different stages of development.  For 
example, one program integrating five separate sub-programs had each of those programs at a 
different stage.  Another large integration project had “literally hundreds of smaller projects – all 
the way from implementation back up the chain to planning.  Scattered – at any one time…at 
every stage.”  
And while technological innovation continues to accelerate, there is a corresponding 
increase in challenges around managing the integration of innovative technologies with those 
already in operational use.  One engineer noted the challenges of working on “many moving 
parts, [which] constantly move.”  Another referred to difficulties in planning: “operationally, it is 
difficult to predict… the network could be really shaken up in the future because you don’t really 
fully know how it’s going to be done.”  Sometimes the pace of innovation is faster than that of 
integration altogether:  “a version is out of date before it hits the street. … evolution is moving 
beyond requirements too quickly to keep up.” Engineers expressed this kind of experience in 
three out of our five cases:  “Too much too fast.” “We knew it was unreasonable under the 
timeline that was planned – that was plainly obvious to folks.”  “Original requirements were very 
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ambitious from [the agency] – do everything for everyone and in a short time frame.  Had such 
good top-cover that no one could say ‘the Emperor had no clothes’.”  
 Pacing tensions also result in challenges to testing and fielding the newly developed 
technologies. One engineer spoke about needing to temporarily suspend innovation in order to 
finish what had already been started: “…discovery was allowed to continue and is still ongoing 
now.  We’re still receiving and responding to it.  There’s an expression that General [X] has been 
saying…   ‘at some point, we need to snap the chalk line’.”  Thus the local environment for 
engineering government infrastructure is often quite messy, and frequently not conducive to 
finishing quality engineering products.   
Given the extent and experience of these challenges, systems engineers are adapting in 
response to what they perceive as sheer necessity.  Some of the engineers we interviewed 
indicated that they are responding to the challenges of agonistic tensions facing their projects by 
following an evolutionary approach.  Denning, Gunderson & Hayes-Roth (2008) posit than an 
evolutionary approach which involves “continual adaptation to the environment” through 
“successive releases” of new technology and/ or survival of the fittest technology is necessary to 
reverse the increasing rate of failure in large system projects. While our findings are generally 
consistent with their proposal, we find that the linking together of large, pre-existing strove-
piped systems already in operational use (developing infrastructure) requires additional 
capability beyond self-organizing communities of like-minded developers.  In infrastructure 
evolution, the environment is not simply technical, but is fraught with agonistic (political) 
tensions between stakeholder groups with conflicting interests, and which prevent 
straightforward consensual agreements about how development should proceed.  
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In the next section, we describe capabilities and skills that systems engineers are 
developing for evolutionary development within environments characterized by rapidly changing 
requirements – both technical and organizational.  Drawing on organizational perspectives in 
addition to engineering knowledge, we argue that the adaptive engineering management 
practices developed by systems engineers can be understood as developing capabilities of 
incremental modularization and re/integration across organizational boundaries -- complemented 
by a new set of interpersonal skills -- to address the stakeholder tensions; in the next section we 
describe some of the more prevalent adaptations. 
Developing Capabilities:  Changing Engineering Management Practices 
Modularizing Technologies 
One capability being developed by engineers is modularizing technologies to support 
separability and combinability of components (Salvador 2007).  Systems engineers are 
modularizing large systems and networks into smallish “chunks” and then working to recombine 
them in different ways at later times.  In addition to facilitating the reconciliation of 
interoperability constraints, smaller chunks of technology afford increased fluidity through or 
around the lumbering bureaucracy of traditional acquisition.  They thus facilitate the approval 
and acceptance process, easing the tech transfer stage of infrastructure evolution (Edwards et al. 
2007).  As one engineer explained: 
One of the most fundamental modularization practices is breaking existing large systems 
and networks into smaller chunks of technologies… For information systems, take on 
acquisitions that you can do within a year - completed within lifecycle - longevity of 
requirement.  You basically evolve systems, pick off bite size increments. Try things and 
take risks and if it doesn’t work, throw it out and start again.  
 
These shorter project timelines help to avoid requirements creep and help to deal with changing 
constraints and policies.  Sometimes this is done serially, segmenting feature development 
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temporally into stages; other times multiple aspects are developed concurrently.  And 
increasingly, systems engineers are willing to cancel or change projects and shorten completion 
times as adaptive strategies.  More projects are operating on “task order” contracts which support 
multiple exit points where they can decide whether to renew the contract, thus allowing them to 
adapt to changes more readily.   
Increasingly, COTS products can meet many of the government needs at lower cost and 
within a shorter time frame.  Reliance on prototypes also helps with shortening the time-frame 
from requirements through development to fielding.  “Prototyping is key … it is used to better 
capture user requirements and to validate as early as possible man-machine interface, etc.” 
Furthermore, prototypes and/or COTS tools may simply be re-categorized to move them into the 
hands of operational users in a timely fashion, circumventing the slow formal acquisition 
process.  “Many [user groups]…are pursuing alternative interim solutions – they use the term 
‘interim’ to get it approved.” 
Integrating across Actors in Conflictual Fields  
Once technologies and programs have been modularized, a different set of challenges 
emerges as the modules must be integrated back into new arrangements.  The complexity of 
technical modules alone challenges bounded rationality; for example one of the information 
system cases involved consolidation of 140 different types of databases into 5 large database 
systems.  Yet technical challenges are compounded by agonistic tensions and disagreements over 
how re-combinations should be accomplished; consequently engineers are developing a second 
set of capabilities for re-integrating modules into a coherent whole (infrastructure) that interfaces 
with affected organizational practices, and thus eases the agonistic tensions.   
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One basic integration practice involves redrawing boundaries around collections of 
legacy and engineering programs to forge new program identities.  “Part of the strategy is 
naming.  People get used to a name and what it means and its scope and how to communicate in 
their … environment.”  For example, one program that had already been in existence for 4-5 
years was being renamed to reflect a change of scope from an exclusive focus on military 
capabilities to one accommodating interoperability with other governmental elements.  The new 
name would then support changes in the conceptualizations and practices that people associated 
with the system. 
Engineering management practices for integration generally rely on agreements 
represented in schedules and documents and other boundary objects (Star 1989; Carlile 2002).  
Documents are commonly used for coordinating across higher-level (i.e., more “abstract”) 
interdependencies.  For example, a Concept of Operations document (“CONOPS”) spells out the 
processes in which a required technology is expected to be used; and a Performance 
Requirements Document (“PRD”) is a written specification of what the technology should be 
able to do once it is built / delivered.  At the lower levels, which involve tracking many more 
details (such as managing changing requirements and risks), interdependencies are more often 
coordinated with spreadsheets or databases; the Dynamic Object-Oriented Requirements System 
(DOORS) is one such tool.   
These changes in boundaries, names and documentary objects must be linked with 
adjustments in complementary stakeholder practices to yield effective integration.  We found 
that the most common approach involves a recurring series of meetings attended consistently by 
representatives from relevant groups, and focused on the associated boundary objects.  These 
meetings occur at multiple levels throughout the enterprise and are comprised of representatives 
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from various stakeholder and subject matter expert groups.
1
  Depending upon the program and 
level of representative members, the groups may be called “boards,” “integrated project teams” 
(IPTs), “working groups,” or comparable terms.   
It is in these recurring group meetings (which are usually co-present, though sometimes 
also use distance communication technology) that agonistic issues of inclusion/exclusion, 
ownership/investment, and temporal pacing arise and can be addressed through collective focus 
on and action involving relevant boundary objects.  Agreements and decisions then represented 
in boundary objects can be likened to “knots in the web of infrastructure technologies and 
concurrent socio-institutional provisions” (Edwards et al. 2007: 36), tying together the different 
participants’ orientations and technological trajectories.  For example, requirements documents 
are important not only for managing changes to requirements, but later for traceability during 
testing.  Similarly, architecture is “one of the key documents that can bridge the requirements to 
capabilities.”  Thus, relationships between different technological modules and temporal stages 
of development are bridged by “flow forward” and “trace back” of representations in the 
boundary objects and accountability pressures in the recurring group meetings.  Across groups 
then, reliance on the boundary objects and upon representation in the meetings constrains and 
enables members of different organizational units to coordinate their practices with each other.  
We found several variations of such enterprise-scale capabilities for integration.  One 
example was called a “Capability Package.”  This approach unites financial, technical, and 
                                                
1
 Participants are likely to include some subset of those specified in the Prince 2 methodology 
(PRINCE 2009): line management, project management, resource manager, operational 
customer, support organization, transformation organization. 
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organizational dimensions of the enterprise in a single process that initiates funding and 
facilitates budget planning, placing financial responsibility within a single funding vehicle and a 
formal organizational process.   It is initiated at the highest level of enterprise management, and 
progresses through consensual agreements to deeper levels or details; overall it is a slow process, 
but it generally results in consensual agreements about how to move forward with engineering 
decisions.   
Another means for integrating a myriad of components and stakeholders is the “spiral 
development” model, which emphasizes iterative integration and operational testing as major 
linkages between technology development and fielding.  This involves provisionally accepting 
large numbers of new candidate technologies, testing them against a baseline system in 
orchestrated field “experiments” involving up to hundreds of participants, and then moving 
forward with those technologies deemed successful.  It is usually carried out incrementally and 
iteratively, as a process extending over multiple years with new technologies spreading out into 
use in managed increments according to CONOPS developed through the exercises.   
And if all other integration efforts fail, a last resort strategy more in keeping with both 
military and traditional systems engineering approaches is to consolidate budgetary and 
managerial control in the office responsible for the systems engineering effort itself.  The person 
at the head may be someone within government, called a Program Executive Officer (PEO), or 
JPEO (for Joint programs).  Other times, a decision may be made to contract management out to 
a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) or a Program Management and Implementation Contractor 
(PMIC).  This helps to rein in divergent stakeholders; however, innovative improvisations are 
often still necessary, and the enforced formal hierarchy may only work for a limited time and to a 
limited extent before pacing tensions overtake it again.   
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Role of Systems Engineering Professionals:  Skills for Influence 
It should be apparent that developing systems engineering capabilities such as 
modularizing technologies and integrating re-combinations of the technologies across 
organizational actors with disparate viewpoints and interests requires more than technical skills.  
Because systems engineers on infrastructure projects work at the intersections of organizational 
and professional groups, they must have other skills to fill such a role appropriately.  They can 
only lead others by example and persuasive argument, rarely with formal authority.  And the 
skills for exercising influence are rarely taught, but necessary nonetheless.  
Systems Engineers Play Ambidextrous Roles  
Unlike most technical professions, systems engineers tend to be allied with, and even 
located within, one customer organization for a long period of time (Johnson 2003; Sapolsky 
2003).  Organizationally, it can be hard to distinguish the systems engineering organization from 
the customer organization: both could have people doing technical work and project 
management.  Systems engineers are often located in government offices with military or civil 
service counterparts, and work together collaboratively with or even oversee them.  They have 
long-term working relations, often eat lunch together and may joke about the only real difference 
being the appearance of their badges.
2
  Some senior systems engineers talk about being “dual-
hatted” which means they have one job title for their employer and another for their customer.  “I 
am dual-hatted, I run the MITRE project that supports the JPEO and I also, from the government 
perspective, run the systems engineering organization for the JPEO.”   
                                                
2
 As employees working on government projects, all participants wear badges indicating their 
personal identity and organizational affiliation.   
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Systems Engineers Cultivate Influence Rather Than Power 
Although a few senior MITRE people are actually dual-hatted and have positions with 
authority in the client organization,
3
 most systems engineers have individual contributor roles 
(presence on teams, liaison roles, etc.) within the client organization.  Their influence therefore 
depends on their reputation and relationships rather than any formal authority. In one project, an 
interviewee referred to their program as an “office of influence.  No budget, do not implement… 
no authority, but a lot of influence.” 
Sources of influence range from the more technical to the more interpersonal.  On the 
more technical side, MITRE has generally been perceived by customers as objective, problem- 
focused, and technically-capable, and therefore trustworthy.  As one interviewee said, “we do 
good analysis, we have good reputations so they come to us.”  Engineers have also generated 
influence through providing demos and technical “guidance.” 
But increasingly technical expertise is insufficient as a source of influence.  “When I 
[first started], we did technical problem solving; now it’s cultural problem solving.” “Success of 
projects is about people.  If you don’t know [the right] people, you can work for a long time and 
not succeed.”  As a result, systems engineers finds themselves exercising influence and even 
leadership from a strategic position at the nexus of information and relationships, but without 
any explicit training or skill base.  “I was put here [by my General Manager] for a reason and 
nobody is giving me a recipe. You have to do this by instinct, figure out a path to get what you 
want.”  “We try to be flexible… Listen, offer suggestions… Compromise, negotiation, 
alternatives…  How do we go from nothing to a system of systems?  Compromise is a big part of 
                                                
3
 And these senior project leaders were overrepresented in our interviews. 
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it.”   MITRE systems engineers do have a significant resource in their access to information and 
people, and to each other:  “These MITRE people at commands have a back channel, so MITRE 
people started hooking people up especially as doing technical design work… in trying to get 
command issues teed up ahead of time…” 
Thus, even while systems engineers are developing new organizational capabilities which 
modularize technologies and contracting processes, and support integration across stakeholders 
in conflictual fields, the systems engineers themselves are also changing their individual roles 
and developing new sets of “people skills” – fairly radical for traditional engineers(!)  These 
skills for exercising influence in a multi-stakeholder environment include listening, delivering 
persuasive arguments, role-taking, relationship building through competence and integrity, and 
negotiation (including compromising and finding win-win solutions). 
Discussion  
The intent of our research project was to capture the emerging knowledge among MITRE 
systems engineers about government enterprise engineering, in the form of capabilities, practices 
and skills.  Our results inform knowledge in several areas:  1)  the management of infrastructure 
technology projects, 2) emergent design and engineering of organizational enterprises, and 3) the 
changing role of systems engineering.  
Management of Infrastructure Technology Projects 
Many have noted the frequency of organizational conflicts around the development of 
information systems (Kling 1980, 1987; Feldman & March 1981; Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991; 
Latour 2005; O’Sullivan 2006).  The infrastructure approach advanced by Edwards et al. (2007) 
highlights the prevalence of political tensions during the consolidation phase of infrastructure 
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evolution – when stovepipe systems and networks are being linked together via gateways.  These 
situations of infrastructure technology development, especially for government enterprises, 
require more than like-minded cooperative communities of developers as postulated by Denning 
et al. (2008).  Our finding that capabilities of modularization and integration, coupled with skills 
for influence, are critical.  
Our results extend Edwards et al.’s (2007) work on infrastructure development by 
detailing agonistic tensions which arise not just over the material and political resources 
comprising the infrastructure, but over the pacing of the infrastructure development process 
itself.  It seems especially important that managers of infrastructure efforts approaching or at the 
consolidation stage pay attention not just to politics and budgets, but also to potential mis-
matches in temporal cycles, especially between those attuned to ongoing operations, those 
concerned with streams of technological innovation and those emphasizing pulses of 
transformative change across the enterprise.   
Further, our analysis revealed that agonistic tensions were more severe in cases where the 
differing stakeholder organizations had traditionally competed with each other, and were much 
more manageable when the component organizations had already established enterprise relations 
with each other so that the emphasis of consolidation was mainly on integrating technical 
systems.  With respect to managing agonistic tensions in infrastructure technology projects, we 
would therefore expect to see significant differences between the kinds of pro-active planning 
(“strategy”) that can be effective within mature enterprises, and the reactive, more nakedly-
political strategies that arise during periods of infrastructure consolidation when enterprise 
leadership is contested and turbulent.  In both situations, there is an increasing need to rely on 
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modularization and integration techniques as well as to recognize the changing role of systems 
engineers.  
Emergent Design and Engineering of Organizational Enterprises  
Studies of large technical systems in situ (in organizations and enterprises) also show that 
it is virtually impossible to cleanly separate technical systems from organizational processes 
(Barley 1986; Orlikowski 1992; DeSanctis & Poole 1994; Garud & Karnoe 2003; Chae & Poole 
2005; Kearns and Sabherwal 2007; Volkoff, Strong and Elmes 2007; Leonardi 2008; Rodon, 
Pastor, Sesé and Christiaanse 2008).  Our results reinforce the findings of these studies:  while it 
is important to plan/design for future changes, it is often not possible to predict or control the 
outcomes.   
Our results suggest, however, that processes of emergent design and engineering can be 
supported through reliance on modularization and integration techniques.  Modularization, such 
as partitioning existing legacy systems by architecture levels and application domains, facilitates 
recombination of technologies on a more rapid and ad hoc basis.  And then, integration managed 
via recurrent meetings of boards, integrated project teams, and working groups focused on 
boundary objects at different levels enables representatives from different organizational units to 
communicate about interdependencies between infrastructure components and to hammer out 
agreements with each other that are then carried back to the different units.  Continued reference 
to the boundary objects and representation at recurrent meetings support organizational members 
in staying coordinated after the agreements have been reached, as they modify pre-existing 
organizational practices.   
Further, we suspect that pairing modularization and integration as complementary 
capabilities may facilitate a kind of meta-articulation at the meso-level.  Together then, 
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modularization and reintegration make it possible to reconfigure socio-technical arrangements in 
ways that ease the continual process of organizing and re-organizing the practices of users and 
developers, and their organizational units. By this we mean that constraints on change as well as 
agreements about it can be propagated both horizontally and vertically across multiple 
organizational levels, application domains, and technical dimensions on an ad hoc and relatively 
rapid basis, authorized through the recurring group meetings at different levels.   
Because of the necessity to maintain confidentiality of case data, we do not step through a 
specific example of meta-articulation in this paper.  However, we believe the mechanism 
described should be of significant scholarly and practical interest.  Our view of meta-articulation 
is similar to Gasser’s (1986) recurrently realigning lattices of constraints and relations, though 
ours emphasizes agonistic tensions at the enterprise level in evolving infrastructure and details 
specific mechanisms of alignment from an infrastructure engineering perspective.  Our approach 
addresses issues regarding orientation and connection of stakeholders in complex engineered 
systems as does to Cutcher-Gershenfeld’s “lateral alignment” (Cass 2005); though ours provides 
more detail about how this can be managed in infrastructure engineering cases.  Our perspective 
on meta-articulation also shares the notion of hierarchical and lateral propagation of constraints 
with Leveson, Dulac, Marais and Carroll’s (2009) systems approach to safety in complex 
systems, although ours privileges bottom-up practitioner-based participatory mechanisms 
through which design can emerge, rather than top-down designs employing formal modeling 
techniques.  
Our work thus contributes to work on organizational design and engineering by 
specifying mechanisms through which components (both technological and organizational) can 
be modularized and (re-)integrated in order to meet emergent needs.   
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The Changing Role of Systems Engineers 
As systems engineers are coming under increasing pressure from ever larger and more 
complex projects, they are grappling with agonistic tensions that prevent the kind of successful 
long-range planning that has traditionally been central to their discipline.  They are instead 
developing evolutionary, adaptive capabilities for modularizing technologies and integrating 
them across conflictual fields of stakeholders.  And at the same time, they are also learning to 
increase customer contact, to improvise, to influence, and to drive collaboration across sponsors.  
There are thus significant findings on the role of systems engineers specifically, within 
infrastructure technology projects.  Systems engineers are not often tied to one specific funder, 
but assumed to be available to whichever funders come out on top, which gives them some clout 
in helping (or hindering) competitions between funders.  Concomitantly, the engineering 
profession experiences internal tension between coming up with the "right [technical] answer" 
and managing negotiation/collaboration processes with stakeholders.  Systems engineers thus 
find themselves in a key leverage position for determining each next step in emergent organizing 
processes:  they are technically savvy and familiar with many stakeholders while their training 
predisposes them to avoid taking political sides.  Combining technical knowledge and familiarity 
with the role of honest broker across multiple stakeholders thus renders systems engineers in a 
position to be a “back door” for integrating across stakeholders, in ways somewhat similar to 
labor negotiators and international diplomats.   
Systems engineers have traditionally had a professional responsibility and a unique role 
in terms of "systems thinking" -- trying to see the big, long-term picture primarily in terms of 
technical constraints within relatively stable environments.  The current set of changes highlights 
their growing need to maintain a delicate balance between what will work technically, and what 
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will work politically, along with what will satisfy the original basic intent of the engineering 
task.  This requires that they listen to other viewpoints and respect other types of expertise.   
Systems engineers working on government infrastructure projects therefore are 
developing a somewhat different skill set than the linear technical analysis of traditional systems 
engineering.  Our results should have obvious implications for the professional training of (and 
curriculum design for) systems engineers, as well as for review and evaluation of their 
accomplishments, including the management of systems engineering programs.  This suggests 
emphasis on new skills in role taking, conflict management, and systems thinking (cf. Sterman 
2000; Davidz 2006; Atwater, Kannan & Stephens 2008).  And to support these new roles and 
skills, there is increased need for thoughtful strategy about how systems engineering 
organizations can use their networks of connections to influence underlying professional 
organizations to build trustful networks ahead of the need for specific technological change.   
Limitations and Future Research 
Of course, our research is based on only five case studies within a highly constrained set 
of government sectors.  Further, each case study is based on a small number of interviews, in 
most cases with only MITRE personnel rather than a sampling of stakeholders, including the 
users of these systems, with their various viewpoints.  Thus, we have a very particular, and 
possibly cloudy, window into the world of systems engineers and systems integrators.  We would 
like to see other researchers complement this work with studies of other enterprises and 
infrastructure technology projects. 
What our study does not reveal is whether the new techniques that are being used are 
sufficient, assuming that systems engineers and/or others can develop the necessary skills.  
While clashes between organizational change and stability are commonly recognized by 
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organizational scholars, we remain somewhat concerned that the extent of tensions between the 
hierarchical command-and-control culture of the military (on the one hand) and the creative 
destruction and fragmentation of accelerating innovation by vendors (on the other) may be 
stretching the limits of systems engineering and integration to the breaking point, especially in 
light of the path dependence that “locks in” effects of choices and can lead to dominance of 
inferior technologies over potentially superior solutions (Edwards et al. 2007: 17).  Research on 
this would be especially important, if not also quite challenging.  
Conclusion  
In this paper we have leveraged practitioner perspectives to identify challenges facing 
systems engineers working on government infrastructure technology projects, and the 
capabilities and skills they are developing in response to those challenges.  We found that 
agonistic tensions surface during the consolidation phase especially when stakeholder relations 
are not already well-established and, at least in our government cases, particularly with regard to 
the pacing of enterprise change and infrastructure development.  In their adaptive response to the 
difficult experience of these tensions, systems engineers are developing capabilities of 
modularization and integration to facilitate more rapid and flexible organizing and re-organizing 
of combinations of technological and organizational components.  Also in support of these 
changes, systems engineers are developing new relational skills, especially with regard to 
influence and functioning as a well-connected neutral third party.  Whether these adaptations will 
be adequate to meet the challenges remains unclear at this time.  
We see several possible paths forward.  First, while systems engineers are not at the 
executive level, there may be advantages to raising their positional authority, at least of a chief 
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engineer or project manager, and highlighting the importance of the role of “honest broker” to 
moderate agonistic tensions.   
Second, the proliferation of agonistic tensions across the broader context within which 
engineering projects must be managed is a relatively new phenomenon for systems engineers and 
a challenge they are grappling with across many dimensions and only succeeding in some.  Is 
there something else that should be done that isn’t currently even on the menu?  To what extent 
should changes in complementary roles, e.g., managers of systems engineers, project managers, 
stakeholder leaders also be evolving?    
Third, perhaps more alarmingly, we note that all of these approaches can be expected to 
work only to the extent that there are consistent groups of stakeholders; problems remain when 
leadership changes in a shorter timeframe than changes can take root.  Bearing in mind Ancona 
& Waller’s (2007) work on “dance of entrainment,” it is interesting to juxtapose our findings 
against work by Hobday, Davies and Prencipe (2005), who posit that systems integration is an 
organizing crux for networks of large-scale economic organization.  What if a resonant 
frequency is being reached in tensions between innovation and integration, especially given 
leadership turnover in military commands and government agencies, so that agonistic 
fragmentation supersedes integration efforts, and large scale infrastructure crumbles?  Like that 
of canaries in a coal mine, the experience of enterprise systems engineers may be forewarning of 
an uninhabitable environment.  What would be our best intelligent response? 
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Appendix A:   Interview Protocol 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview.  It is part of a joint MITRE-MIT 
research study that leverages social science to help define the discipline and advance the practice 
of “enterprise systems engineering.” [hand them copy of one page description of research 
project]   Enterprise systems engineering encompasses and enriches traditional systems 
engineering as it is practiced within a broader enterprise environment.  <Program name> has 
been identified as good cases for this study.  Your participation in this interview is voluntary.  
You may skip over any questions for any reason and you may stop at any time.  Would you be 
willing to sign this consent form indicating you agree to participate in the interview?  [hand them 
consent form] 
 
A. Would you please tell me the name of the organization you now work for, your current 
position, and give me a brief overview of your role in the work of <program name>? 
 
B. What is your Program Strategy? and what stage(s) are you in currently (planning, 
implementing, fielding, maintenance/evolution)?   What is your development and fielding 
strategy and to what extent are you using prototypes, experiments, and betas?   
 
C. What engineering processes do you use?   
   How do you do requirements? 
     How do you do software design? 
     How do you do software development? 
 
D. What is your program's organizational approach (including government and contractors)? 
 
E. How does your program deal with changing requirements and constraints?  
 
F. How do you work with your stakeholders?  Please discuss your internal stakeholders, 
external stakeholders, and relationships with competitors and other programs.   
 
G. If you had to pass this project off to someone tomorrow, what (one thing) would you want 
them to know? 
 
H. Is there anything else you’d like to tell me/us about the program or its current context? 
 
 
 
